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In the United States, March figures confirmed that retail sales are slowing after rebounding steeply in January. Sales excluding cars and gasoline fell by 0.3% on the month in nominal terms, albeit a little less than expected. The control group, which is used as a proxy of total goods consumption, fell in similar proportion, i.e., by about -0.5% in real terms when using the March goods consumer price index (+0.2%) as a deflater.
Fig. 1 – United States: Consumption shrank in March after rebounding strongly early in theyear
Retail sales, control group, nominal, month-on-month, %
Household consumption, nominal, month-on-month, %
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr., Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
Despite this decline, consumption is still likely to make a positive contribution to GDP growth in 1Q23. We expect GDP growth so far this year to have been far more solid than previously expected, with an annualised expansion estimated at almost 2%. Even so, we still see a further slowing in activity for 2Q23, and a possible contraction in 3Q23 with signs of a downturn in the job market.
For the moment, the job market remains strong and continues to support US consumer confidence. For example, the University of Michigan flash results for April suggest that confidence has recovered a little, but while remaining at historically low levels.
Inflation in particular remains a concern. Inflation expectations for next year have risen by 1 point (to 4.6% year-on-year from 3.6% previously), no doubt due to the upturn in gasoline prices. Longer-term expectations remain stable at 2.9%.
Fig. 2 – United States: Consumer confidence is turning up but is still very low
We’ll see what impact this new energy “tax” will have on consumption in the coming months. That impact will probably be negative.
One thing that is certain is that production cuts decided by Russia (600k bbl./d.) and, even more so, OPEC countries (1 million bbl./d.) have broken the downward momentum in oil prices. The acceleration in Chinese economic activity could also push up energy prices between now and yearend.
This increase is likely to subtract from the positive basis effects that energy prices had had on inflation in most countries so far this year. As a result, not only could we see core inflation decline only very gradually but also total inflation recede less than had been expected.
Fig. 3 – Oil: prices have begun to rise again in reaction to production cuts by Russia and OPEC and to anticipations of a recovery in the Chinese economy
This increase in energy prices is unlikely to make central banks overreact, given that it will be viewed as a factor slowing down the economy by weighing directly on household purchasing power.
Even so, it could continue to boost prices throughout the economy, as companies pass on higher costs into their sales prices.
Speaking of business costs, in the US, the Dallas Fed released figures on March wage increases in the economy. Wages are reaccelerating on a year-on-year basis. This therefore contradicts the hourly wage figures that emerged from the jobs survey of companies released a little more than one week ago, which pointed towards a deceleration. We know that the business surveys are subject to some biases, particularly as regards the skewing that can occur in the job market. The Atlanta Fed survey is more reliable.
Fig. 4 – United States: Wages reaccelerated in March, based on the Dallas Fed statistic.
Without worrying too much about cost trends, it is nonetheless certain that, for the Fed, recent inflation signals continue to move in the direction of maintaining a tightening policy for more time to come, in order to move inflation back to its 2% target.
The Fed is well aware that, at this point, maintaining this goal is essential to holding onto its credibility and keeping inflation expectations anchored. This is one of the main reasons why we expect the Fed to stick to its tightening bias (i.e., no rate cuts) until early 2024, unless, of course, the US economy suffers a far greater slowdown than the one we are currently forecasting.
The bond markets and the markets in general are having a hard time pricing in this scenario. Their belief that the Fed would rush to the markets’ rescue if they showed too much weakness, remains firmly anchored. The coming months will surely be decisive on how this gap in views between market participants and central bankers will play out.
Meanwhile, the Chinese economy continues to recover, and the recovery seems to be spreading throughout the economy. The real-estate market in particular seems to be improving, but this will be a very slow process, given the extent of last year’s slump.
New housing prices rose again in March, based on figures in China’s top 70 cities. This may not be the trend nationwide, but this recovery is nonetheless a positive sign. Measures to assist property developers, particularly to finish construction jobs that had been left in limbo, appear to have restored some confidence.
Fig. 5 China: The real-estate sector is recovering very slowly from its slump, driven by measures to assist property developers
The road to recovery to a robust real-estate sector will no doubt be long, but the recovery in activity does look real.